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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 11-3466 
______________ 
 
BRIAN WHITE, 
 
         Appellant 
 
v. 
 
JACK BROMMER; BOROUGH OF COLUMBIA; 
MATTHEW LEDDY 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 5-09-cv-04353) 
Honorable James Knoll Gardner, District Judge 
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 26, 2012 
 
BEFORE:  FISHER and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges, 
and OLIVER, District Judge* 
 
(Filed: July 16, 2012) 
______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
*Honorable Solomon Oliver, Jr., Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the    
Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation. 
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 This matter comes on before this Court on an appeal by plaintiff-appellant Brian  
White from an order granting summary judgment against him entered August 17, 2011, 
in this civil action which arose out of a disturbance in a bar in the Borough of Columbia 
in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, on May 24, 2009.  We only summarize the critical 
facts inasmuch as the District Court set forth the facts more completely in its 
comprehensive opinion accompanying the order of August 17, 2011.   
 It is undisputed that White, who was employed at the bar though was off duty at 
the time of the disturbance but was in the bar as a patron, was involved in that incident.  
In his brief he minimizes the incident by describing it, without giving details, as “a minor 
altercation.”  Appellant’s br. at 2.  In point of fact, White shoved Darryl Leese, another 
patron at the bar, to the floor because Leese, in White’s opinion, had harassed a female 
patron at the bar.  There is, however, a dispute concerning whether Leese actually 
harassed the woman as the bartender did not think that he had done so. 
 There is no dispute except that the bartender called the police emergency 
telephone number and advised the operator that White “flipped out and knocked a guy off 
the bar stool.”  As a result the police came to the bar, but by the time they arrived White 
had left.  The police later arrested White at another location.  There is a dispute as to the 
effect of White’s consumption of alcohol on his condition as he denies being intoxicated, 
a contention that the bartender has supported.  On the other hand, when the police 
encountered White they thought that he was intoxicated.  It is also undisputed that White 
was in the bar for about five hours before the incident and consumed a portion of three 
pitchers of beer which he shared with another patron.   
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 As a result of the incident, the bar terminated White’s employment and the police 
filed disorderly conduct and public drunkenness charges against him before a district 
justice.  The justice, however, found White not guilty on the charges, following which 
White brought this action. 
 White’s complaint included claims against two police officers involved in the case 
and their employer, the Borough of Columbia.  These claims included allegations of false 
arrest, malicious prosecution, violation of the right to contract, violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause, wrongful interference with a contractual relationship, and defamation.  
The contractual counts were related to the termination of his employment at the bar.  In 
addition, he asserted that the Borough was liable to him under the principles the Supreme 
Court set forth in Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018 
(1978).  Notwithstanding the broad allegations in his complaint, White has narrowed the 
issues on this appeal by stating in his reply brief that “[t]he issue presented . . . for review 
on the appeal is whether there is a genuine issue of material fact in regards to whether the 
Defendants had probable cause to arrest the Plaintiff, and, consequently, whether the 
District Court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.”  
Appellant’s reply br. at 1. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367 as White 
has advanced both federal claims and state law supplemental claims.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review on this appeal, see 
Shaver v. Siemans Corp., 670 F.3d 462, 470 (3d Cir. 2012), and thus can affirm only if 
“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [defendants are] entitled to 
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judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  The Supreme Court has indicated 
that a fact is material only if its resolution in favor of the party against whom the 
summary judgment is sought would preclude granting the motion against him.  See 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). 
 Clearly there are disputes of fact in this case.  In particular, there is a dispute as to 
which police officer determined that White should be arrested, whether Leese harassed 
the female patron, and whether White was intoxicated at the time of the incident.  But 
none of these factual disputes are material as their resolution cannot affect the appellees’ 
possible liability.  Based on any objective view of the evidence, the police had probable 
cause to arrest White as they had a reasonable basis to believe that he had committed an 
offense.  See Barna v. City of Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d 809, 819 (3d Cir. 1994).  Thus, the 
resolution against him of the issue that White believes controls the outcome of this appeal 
requires that we affirm.  Accordingly, even if a trier of fact were to resolve the discrete 
disputes of fact that we have identified in White’s favor, the District Court properly 
would have granted summary judgment against him. 
 The order granting summary judgment entered August 17, 2011, will be affirmed. 
